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Abstract
In this paper we attempt to reply to the thoughtful comments made on our book, 
Responsible Brains, by a stellar group of scholars. Our reply focuses on two topics 
discussed in the commenting papers: first, the issue of responsibility for negligent 
behavior; and second, the broad claim that facts about brain function are norma-
tively inert. In response to worries that our theory lacks normative implications, we 
will concentrate on an area where our theory has clear relevance to law and legal 
policy: juvenile responsibility.
1  Negligence
Several of our commenters focused on our handling of negligence, no doubt because 
negligence is where the rubber meets the road in a theory of legal responsibility. 
And as Dennis Patterson notes in his comment, we feel our handling of negligence 
cases shows our theory to be superior to some other recent scientific approaches to 
responsibility (Levy 2014).
The discussion of culpable negligence in Responsible Brains (hereafter, RB) uses 
the real-life example of Bert (not his real name), who was arrested for child neglect 
in Illinois after appearing to honestly forget that it was his weekend to watch his kids 
(133). Instead of meeting them at his apartment, Bert went straight from work to the 
airport to fly to Las Vegas, leaving his two young children—who were “latchkey 
kids”—home alone for an entire weekend. Under Illinois law, Bert is only respon-
sible for child abandonment if he “knowingly” left his children unattended. Yet the 
judge in his case found him guilty, in a result that coheres with the law in other 
states and, arguably, our commonsense judgments regarding these sorts of cases. 
“The state doesn’t just let parents forget about their children,” announced the judge 
as she handed down her verdict.
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When our forgettings violate an important standard of care, such as the one 
required of parents for their children, and this violation causes harm, blame seems 
appropriate. But what grounds blame (and possibly punishment) in such cases? On 
most theories of responsibility, we are justified in blaming a person for causing harm 
if that harm was intentional; or, if the person knew of a risk of harm and performed 
the risky behavior anyway. Similarly, criminal guilt typically requires both an act 
that causes criminal harm (actus reus) and that a defendant possessed a culpable 
mental state (mens rea) related to that criminal harm. So, a person might be found 
guilty of a homicide if they acted for the purpose of causing a death or knowing that 
a death might result.
Lapses or forgettings may be prosecuted as negligence, however, even where 
there is no conscious desire to cause harm, nor any belief that harm may result from 
an act. In negligence cases there is not even a conscious disregard of the risk of 
harm; for this constitutes recklessness, and if the forgetting is honest, one did not 
know there was a risk of harm at the time of the harmful action. Other cases of 
negligence include circumstances where a person caused themselves not to be able 
to form the requisite mens rea, and then caused harm (some such cases involve vol-
untary intoxication). As we will see, lapse and intoxication cases are quite different, 
even though both have been prosecuted as criminal negligence. On first glance, one 
might think that what unifies these cases is that negligent persons are responsible 
for the harm they caused because, even in the absence of an intentional or know-
ing mental state, they ought to have acted differently—they should have paid better 
attention, should not have driven home, etc. But as we will see, things are more 
complicated than this.
On the particular theory of responsibility articulated in RB, a person is respon-
sible only if they possess a Minimal Working Set of executive functions (MWS). 
These brain functions are necessary to what philosophers call “reasons-responsive-
ness” (Fischer and Ravizza 1998) and what H.L.A. Hart termed “capacity responsi-
bility,” which he claimed was a precondition for legal liability (1968). A person who 
is responsive to moral and legal reasons has the capacity to act in accordance with 
those reasons via the executive functions of attentional focus, task-shifting, plan-
ning, and inhibition. Persons who are reasons-responsive are responsible when they 
act because they have what Fischer and Ravizza call “guidance control” over that 
act, which justifies application of blame and, in some cases, criminal guilt and pun-
ishment. This is our theory of responsibility in a nutshell.1
A person who is negligent fails to be responsive to an important moral or legal 
reason related to the harm they cause. The primary question with regard to neg-
ligence, then, is whether agents are responsible for such failures. Hart understood 
culpable negligence as a failure to exercise capacity responsibility, specifically “the 
1 Many of our critics wonder what we are offering in addition to Hart’s and Fischer and Ravizza’s theo-
ries of responsibility. That is, surely it is interesting to speculate about the function and even location 
of brain activity related to responsible action; but does this information do any normative work beyond 
what is already implied in a “standard” reasons-responsive theory? In a later section of this response we 
will try to show why we think the answer is “yes.”
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capacity to advert to, and think about and control, conduct and its risks” (1968, p. 
157). Others argue that failure alone is not enough to ground responsibility; we need 
some additional inculpatory factor to ground negligent responsibility (Stark 2016). 
This inculpatory factor might be some synchronic or diachronic state of affairs, 
often having to do with an agent’s rational or cognitive system.
In RB we claim that negligent persons like Bert are indeed responsible for their 
acts, although less responsible than persons who intentionally cause harm. Many 
of our commentators agree with us that persons can be criminally responsible for 
negligent behavior, but take issue with our analysis of the grounds for negligent 
responsibility; these commentators include Moore, Agule, and Patterson. Douglas 
Husak, however, disagrees that negligent actors are responsible at all. We will 
begin with his concerns.
a. Husak on RB on Negligence
Husak worries that the neuroscience we utilize in RB neither informs nor chal-
lenges the “established orthodoxy in the Anglo-American legal tradition” on the 
topic of negligence (Husak this volume). He also claims our account of negli-
gence “misrepresents” that traditional orthodoxy. Husak seems to indicate that 
we shouldn’t assume criminal negligence is something we must account for, since 
“perhaps most” legal philosophers reject it as indefensible; at any rate, he argues 
that our defense of it is inadequate. We won’t attempt to sort out how many legal 
philosophers and scholars doubt that people should (sometimes) be held respon-
sible on the basis of negligence; it is enough to note that Husak himself is in this 
group; although others are not (see, for example, Stark 2016; Sarch, 2018; Baron 
2020; Moore and Hurd 2011), and that negligence is still a category of mens rea 
under the Model Penal Code (MPC), including Section 210.4, which lists negli-
gent homicide as a felony.
As indicated above, attempts to defend culpable negligence include identifying 
some state of a person’s rational system as the inculpating factor causally related 
to the harm. Such approaches may involve “tracing” to seek an inculpating factor 
in the person’s past. Another tactic is using counterfactuals to describe conditions 
under which the negligent party failed to attend risks when they should have. Our 
aim in RB was to reject tracing and offer a diachronic inculpating factor, although 
it may appear that we waffle a bit between offering an inculpating factor and look-
ing to counterfactuals.
One example of the “inculpating factor” approach is Garvey (2006), who 
argues that negligent responsibility is justified where a person has doxastic self-
control. Negligent culpability, says Garvey, consists not in any prior actual choice 
to do wrong, or imagined hypothetical choice to do wrong, but in the culpable 
failure to exercise control over one’s beliefs. Stark (2016) expands this theory, 
including within the sphere of doxastic self-control the ability to manage one’s 
beliefs and character traits. Stark then claims we can hold persons responsible 
when they have background beliefs that could have led to an understanding of the 
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risk, even where the belief regarding the risk is not actually formed (2016, pp. 
247–249).
In RB we do something similar: we ground responsibility for unknown risks in 
the diachronic possession of an MWS, which we claim enables the doxastic self-
control discussed by Stark. More generally, executive functions enable the capac-
ity for self-formation and self-governance (Roskies 2018); and we claim persons 
with an MWS can manage not only their beliefs but their own reasons-respon-
siveness, developing dispositions to be sensitive to moral and legal reasons, and 
to be norm-abiding. For this reason, we are comfortable claiming that a person 
can be responsible for a risk even if their MWS was not engaged with regard to 
that risk. A person with diachronic possession of an MWS is responsible if they 
could have engaged their MWS in such a way that the risk was acknowledged, 
even if they did not. MWS is our inculpating factor, but we offer a counterfactual 
explanation as to why the MWS grounds responsibility in such cases.
Husak claims that to ground responsibility for negligent acts, our position 
requires that agents be responsive to objective—rather than subjective—reasons 
for acting. By his lights, our view demands that agents be responsive to reasons of 
which they are not, and could not reasonably be expected to be, aware at the time of 
their negligent action. This demand “clearly exceeds the capacities of any human 
brain,” Husak argues; all one can do “at a given time…is to respond to the reasons 
of which [one is] aware” (5).
We wonder who is bucking the legal orthodoxy here. As other commenters have 
noted, criminal negligence persists as a legal doctrine, and under negligence laws 
persons are held responsible when they ought to have known their actions created 
a substantial risk, where that risk causes criminal harm. The criminal law does 
indeed hold people responsible for things they were not—but ought to have been—
aware of. And we think this is correct because of the diachronic capacities discussed 
above. Husak may think the law should not demand this much of an agent, but that 
complaint does not seem an objection to our theory of responsibility in particular.
One of us has expressed some worries about Husak’s theory of criminal respon-
sibility elsewhere (Sifferd 2018). Husak (2016) adopts a unique subjective version 
of Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998) reasons-responsive theory of responsibility. Judg-
ments of moral responsibility, he says, require an “internal assessment of the reason-
responsiveness of agents” (Husak 2016, p. 154).
But Fischer and Ravizza’s theory revolves around the idea that we are morally 
responsible for an action when the mechanism that issues that action is moderately 
reasons-responsive in an appropriate way. To be reasons-responsive an agent must 
have been regularly receptive to a range of reasons such that she manifests an intel-
ligible pattern of responsiveness (over time) from a third person perspective (Fischer 
and Ravizza 1998, p. 71). In addition, it must be shown an agent would react to at 
least one sufficient reason to do otherwise than she did in some possible scenario—
that is, she might have acted differently in some close possible world (44). How-
ever, it does not follow that the agent could have responded differently to the actual 
reasons. To be responsible, Fischer and Ravizza require only that a person possess 
a mechanism that is, over time, moderately sensitive to reasons of the right type; 
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and again, they offer counterfactual explanations as to why this sort of mechanism 
grounds responsibility.
Of course, there are many kinds of negligence cases. In those where someone was 
distracted from a risk, or created a risk due to a lapse, it seems straightforward that 
the possession of an MWS and guidance control can ground responsibility, whether 
one frames this as an inculpating factor or prefers the counterfactual analysis that 
one could have responded to the relevant reasons. But as Husak notes, there are 
other negligence cases where persons seemingly do not possess an MWS at the time 
of action, including voluntary intoxication. In these cases, one might wonder how 
executive functions can be thought to be involved in the action related to the risk 
of harm at all (5). We discuss such cases when handling criticisms from other com-
menters, below.
Finally, Husak wonders about how our theory handles cases of factual mistakes, 
given we are willing to hold persons responsible who do not know they are perform-
ing risky behavior. Husak claims we are only responsible for what we know; even 
if we have stupid factual or moral beliefs that are mistaken such that a reasonable 
person wouldn’t hold them, we aren’t responsible when we harm others based on 
a mistaken understanding regarding risk. This claim is directly related to his belief 
that the sole purpose of criminal law and punishment is to address moral wrongs 
by delivering just deserts. One who acts without knowing the risks isn’t morally 
blameworthy.
In RB, we support a hybrid justification for criminal law and punishment. One 
of us has written elsewhere about the fit between forward-looking and backward-
looking justifications for criminal law (Sifferd, forthcoming). Hart (1968) appeals to 
consequentialist principles as the “general justifying aim” of criminal punishment, 
although in practice forward-looking factors seem to play a less important role than 
retribution in justifying criminal punishment, especially if one looks to legislative 
codes and documents.2 In the US, the state typically claims hybrid justification (both 
forward- and backward-looking) when assigning punishments, where retribution 
tends to be the primary aim, with deterrence considered within the parameters estab-
lished by considerations of “just deserts”.
Forward-looking justifications other than deterrence, however, can be offered for 
our punishment practices: (1) the criminal law makes society’s moral rules more 
salient, and in this way encourages compliance with those rules; and (2) holding 
persons criminally responsible has the forward-looking effect of assigning, support-
ing, and even enhancing the moral agency that underpins responsible action. We 
2 For example, members of the American Law Institute (ALI) voted to approve a new final draft of 
Model Penal Code: Sentencing in 2017. In the newest iteration of the MPC, which is meant as a guid-
ing document for all state penal codes, the stated purpose of criminal sentencing is “to render sentences 
in all cases within a range of severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime 
victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders.” When “reasonably feasible” the state should also attempt 
“to achieve offender rehabilitation, general deterrence, incapacitation of dangerous offenders, restitution 
to crime victims, preservation of families, and reintegration of offenders into the law-abiding community, 
provided these goals are pursued within the boundaries of proportionality…” Sect.  1.02 Model Penal 
Code: Sentencing (Am. Law Inst., Proposed Final Draft, 2017).
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ground these claims in social theories of responsibility, such as Victoria McGeer’s 
scaffolded responsibility (McGeer 2015; McGeer and Pettit 2013) and Manuel Var-
gas’s agency cultivation (Vargas 2013), which emphasize the ways moral agency can 
be scaffolded upon and bolstered by cultural norms and a societal audience.
Interestingly, mistakes of fact and mistakes of law—which often boil down to 
mistakes about what is right and wrong—come apart when we consider forward-
looking aims of criminal law. In part due to the relative accessibility of information 
about moral and legal norms, mistakes of law seem to be within a person’s control in 
a way that mistakes of fact usually aren’t, which means that persons can be incentiv-
ized by one’s societal audience and the law to avoid them. Mistakes of fact, on the 
other hand, are often the sort that a reasonable person would make under the cir-
cumstances. We think people ought to be excused for reasonable mistakes of fact—
but not law—in part because the threat of punishment is unlikely to make persons 
less likely to make a reasonable mistake with regard to their perceptions. It seems 
unfair for the criminal law to demand that people be more than reasonably careful 
with regard to their factual understandings. It is reasonable, however, for the threat 
of punishment to encourage awareness of moral and legal norms. Someone consid-
ering using a tax haven may be disposed to investigate the fine points of tax law; gun 
owners may be motivated to investigate state castle laws. In the same vein, it is fair 
to ask people with diachronic possession of an MWS to exercise guidance control 
and reasonable care so as not to create risks that cause criminal harm.
b. Moore on RB on Negligence
Another commentator, the estimable Michael S. Moore, says he agrees with the 
broader strokes of our argument but claims our theory does not properly manage 
negligence cases. At the root of Moore’s critique is a fairly fundamental worry: 
that we have adopted the wrong version of compatibilism—namely, reasons-
responsive compatibilism—and, to make matters worse, have amended the stand-
ard reasons-responsive approach in unhelpful ways. Before returning to the spe-
cific topic of negligence, we will address this more general line of criticism.
Moore takes us to task for not giving our readers a full taxonomy of compatibilist 
theories (an entirely fair charge). He distinguishes source compatibilism and condi-
tionalist compatibilism as the two major camps of compatibilist thought. The views 
we emphasize in RB, namely reasons-responsive and deep-self theories, are both 
species of source compatibilism. Conditionalist compatibilism, which we do not dis-
cuss in RB, requires for responsible action that a person could have chosen other 
than she did (adopting the principle of alternate possibilities, or PAP).
Moore alleges that in RB, despite not acknowledging the gulf between source and 
conditionalist compatibilism, we betray our awareness of that divide and align our-
selves with one side of it, “put[ting] aside conditionalist analyses with [our] blunt 
conclusion that ‘the ability to do otherwise is not necessary to responsible action’” 
(Moore, this volume). This allegation rests on a misreading of the passage in ques-
tion (one we may have invited). In the line quoted by Moore we are not asserting our 
own view, but rehearsing Harry Frankfurt’s classic argument (1969) against the PAP. 
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The sentence begins “And if that is right [i.e., if agents are still responsible even in 
‘Frankfurt cases’], then the ability to do otherwise is not necessary to responsible 
action” (Hirstein, Sifferd, and Fagan 2018, p. 48). Our position on whether responsi-
ble action requires the ability to do otherwise is not so simply put—and depends, we 
would say, on what “ability to do otherwise” means.
Putting this aside, there is an important substantive question raised by Moore’s 
critique: Have we chosen the wrong side by aligning with source compatibilism, 
and, as a result, have we left key concepts such as “capacity” under-analyzed?
The conditionalist camp, which Moore speaks for here, contends not that 
source compatibilism is utterly wrongheaded, but that it is not enough to ground 
responsibility. Moore claims that “responsibility for some wrongful action 
A requires more than that A be properly sourced within certain structures and 
capacities of the agent (although it does require at least that)” (6). The more he 
refers to here is a “freedom worth wanting:” in conditionalist terms, the free-
dom to do otherwise or the power of “choosing and doing one thing rather than 
another” (6). We suspect that the counterfactual freedom Moore embraces is quite 
close indeed to the freedom of an agent with guidance control over their actions. 
And if the divide between source and conditionalist compatibilists can be bridged 
in this way, maybe we can defuse Moore’s worry that source compatibilism is 
insufficient to the task of grounding responsibility.
On Moore’s brief restatement of the conditionalist view, responsibility for an 
action entails the ability to have chosen and done otherwise, analyzed in terms of 
what the agent would have done if certain other circumstances had obtained (Moore 
2021, p. 7). Conditionalists of different flavors and vintages fill in the antecedent of 
this conditional with different details—Moore nods to both the “classic” and “new” 
subcamps of conditionalism—but the basic picture is the same. If one rejects lib-
ertarian contra-causal free will, what could this counterfactually specified ability 
come to? Moore has an entirely reasonable answer: “‘Ability,’ by this analysis, does 
not refer as much to facts about successful future behavior as it does to inner dispo-
sitions and to the physical equipment that realizes them…” (7, our emphasis).
It’s in this last move of conditionalist reasoning that we see the common ground 
shareable, if not explicitly shared, between conditionalist and source compatibilists. 
For conditionalists, responsibility for an act requires the counterfactually specified 
freedom to have chosen/done otherwise, which is purportedly more than just proper 
sourcing “within certain structures and capacities of the agent.” But possessing this 
all-important ability turns out to be mostly, if not entirely, a matter of having the 
right “inner dispositions” realized by an intact set of “physical equipment” (7). To 
our ears this sounds very much like the “structures and capacities” of the agent; it 
is not clear what the ability to do otherwise amounts to that would not be captured 
by a plausible source-compatibilist view of how responsible actions originate from 
within reasons-responsive mechanisms (or the deep self) of the agent.
Our point is not that Moore’s counterfactual language is only a roundabout 
way of describing something like an MWS, or that conditionalist compatibilism is 
“really” source compatibilism in disguise. Nonetheless Moore’s language seems 
consistent with many versions of source compatibilism, including Fischer and 
Ravizza’s reasons-responsive view and our (RB’s) elaboration of that approach; 
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indeed, it may be that each position understands its “primitives” in terms bor-
rowed from the other. Consider Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998) guidance control: 
One of the criteria for the existence of even a weakly reasons-responsive mecha-
nism is that the agent who possesses the mechanism would react to at least one 
sufficient reason to do otherwise than the agent did in some possible scenario 
(38).3 Thus a counterfactually specified ability is already implicit in this idea 
of a reasons-responsive mechanism, just as something like a reasons-responsive 
mechanism seems implicit in the idea of a counterfactual ability to do otherwise.
It is easy to imagine allegations of “collapse” being lodged from either side 
of the source-versus-conditionalist divide: conditionalists arguing that a reasons-
responsive mechanism is ultimately a set of counterfactuals, and reasons-respon-
sive theorists arguing that the relevant counterfactual “abilities” are ultimately 
picking out a reasons-responsive mechanism. It’s not clear who would have the 
upper hand in this debate or what would be illuminated by its playing out. Per-
haps we ought to think of counterfactual abilities and reasons-responsive capaci-
ties as defined in terms of each other; perhaps one’s allegiance to source or con-
ditionalist compatibilism depends on which side of this analysis one prefers to 
focus on. We think this is an interesting avenue for further exploration and we 
thank Moore for alerting us to it, but we don’t find it too troubling a prospect for 
our account of negligence in RB.
However, Moore’s critique includes other points worth addressing. Beyond his 
reservations about reasons-responsive views generally, he worries that our dia-
chronic version of reasons-responsiveness is weaker than Fischer and Ravizza’s syn-
chronic version. As indicated above, the diachronic component of our theory was 
meant to draw attention to the fact that moral and legal norms are a large part of 
the normative culture that human beings are asked to be sensitive to; and that these 
norms can interact with an MWS (or reasons-responsive mechanism) such that we 
can often shape our moral agency over time to be more risk-averse and law-abiding 
(Vargas 2013, 2015; McGeer 2015). As normative beliefs are developing, we think, 
dispositions to act in more or less norm-abiding ways are also under construction. 
We act not only in relation to synchronic mental states or decisions, but against a 
background of beliefs developed over time regarding the act’s normative quality 
(beliefs the agent could report if asked).
To return to the topic of negligence and the case of Bert the forgetful father: We 
claim that Bert is responsible for his harmful action because (1) he had an MWS 
at the time of the action and (2) he had an MWS throughout the time when his 
dispositions and habits regarding his parenting duties were being formed. Because 
of (1), Bert had guidance control with regard to the act that harmed his children 
even though he was unaware of the risk of harm (where under different conditions 
he might have been aware of the risk). And because of (2), he also had many ear-
lier opportunities both to shape his disposition to be a mindful parent and to adjust 
for his shortcomings in that department. Moore claims our strategy of holding Bert 
3 Another condition is that the agent must “own” their mechanism by taking responsibility for it. We 
note that one can do this by directing reactive attitudes toward ones’ own actions; and in a diachronic 
sense, one might exhibit ownership by manipulating the operations of their mechanism over time.
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responsible for his lapse based upon his possession of a diachronic MWS is a type of 
tracing account (see below), and vulnerable to an objection familiar to such views: 
If the mere possession of an MWS at the time of Bert’s action is not enough to 
ground his responsibility, then any earlier failures we may blame him for—not keep-
ing a calendar of his parenting commitments, for example—are likewise not his fault 
based upon mere possession of an MWS (2021, 9). And if the mere possession of an 
MWS at the time of Bert’s action is enough to hold him responsible, then the dia-
chronic MWS and its wider timescale seem not to be doing any work at all. This is 
an excellent point.
A few words on tracing accounts, by which some have attempted to ground 
responsibility in negligence cases via a technique where one traces back to a deci-
sion or action that led to the current harm for which one is now responsible (Fis-
cher and Tognazzini 2009; Vargas 2005). Tracing looks into an agent’s past in an 
attempt to find a culpable mental state that can be reasonably linked to the current 
harm. This technique, however, is problematic even in the cases for which it is most 
often used; namely, cases where an intoxicated agent causes harm. A drunk driver 
may lack the capacity to understand the risk of harm their driving poses, but it is 
typically extraordinarily difficult to identify a single decision or action that led to an 
incapacitating level of intoxication (Vargas 2005; King 2009). For which decision is 
the agent relevantly culpable: the decision to drive to the bar? To have the first drink 
(if they are an alcoholic), or the second, or the third?
We should have been clearer about the grounds for Bert’s responsibility. He is 
responsible because he possessed an MWS both synchronically at the time of the act 
that caused harm and diachronically, even though he did not engage his MWS with 
regard to the risk that his kids might be left home alone. On our view, these are the 
“easy” negligence cases—where an actor unknowingly breaches an important stand-
ard of care and causes harm, but has both diachronic and synchronic possession of 
an MWS. Cases where there is only a diachronic, but not synchronic MWS (e.g. vol-
untary intoxication cases); or no diachronic, but a synchronic MWS (e.g. negligent 
swamp man) are significantly harder (and in the latter case, probably so rare as to be 
uninteresting). More on this below.
Moore is worried that our MWS/guidance control theory doesn’t give an adequate 
account of ability or capacity, which is what we are pointing to as the diachronic/
synchronic grounds of responsibility. On Moore’s conditionalist view, Bert is cul-
pable for not meeting his parenting obligations because he could have met them—
meaning that, if the world were different (say we’re in a world where Bert and his 
ex-partner were assigned a parenting coordinator that made them keep an online 
parenting calendar; or his ex-partner had called to remind him about the children’s 
visit as he drove to the airport), Bert would have kept his obligations.
Aside from noting the fundamental compatibility between conditionalist and 
source-compatibilist accounts (see above), we are unsure that Moore’s theory is 
more specific and useful than ours. Moore faces the difficult task of determining 
what features might be altered in an agent or their environment to indicate a range of 
ability. For example, in a world where Bert was taught to be organized by a fastidi-
ous parent, would he have kept his obligations? If yes, what does this mean regard-
ing Bert’s current ability to be a good parent? Or, in a world where a co-worker 
 Criminal Law and Philosophy
1 3
asked Bert if he had his kids that weekend, would Bert have started to wonder about 
his schedule and asked his ex, keeping his obligation in front of his mind and meet-
ing it? Questions like these are relevant to assessing the grounds for Bert’s respon-
sibility, and worth asking—but in our view they are probing, in their counterfactual 
way, whether Bert properly developed and possessed an MWS in the time leading up 
to his harmful action.
Moore admits, of course, that it is “enormously tricky” to frame the relevant 
counterfactuals needed to discern who had the ability to understand the risks associ-
ated with negligent behavior. But he says it is necessary to “distinguish two kinds of 
cases where some executive control function could have operated but didn’t,” versus 
not operating because it couldn’t have done. Again, it seems we might answer this 
question by noting that a person who possesses an MWS at the time of a crime, and 
in some period beforehand, certainly had the ability to have engaged their executive 
functions with regard to the risk—to be sensitive to it, to deliberate with regard to it, 
and to act or inhibit action based upon an understanding of it. To possess an MWS 
diachronically means that one’s MWS engages in response to appropriate conditions 
(some persons with schizophrenia or REM behavioral disorder may be exemplars of 
a dysfunctional MWS).
Perhaps, however, Moore’s view handles the intoxication case better than ours. 
We have a problem in such cases, because often the person acting doesn’t have an 
MWS at the time of the act that caused harm—even if they did possess one in the 
time period running up to the risky behavior. On Moore’s theory, though, it seems 
clear that the actual world could have changed in various simple ways so that some-
one who drove drunk and caused harm would not have done so. In such cases it 
seems we must hang responsibility on a person’s possession of an MWS during 
the time frame before they were incapacitated alone; or indeed, engage in tracing, 
thereby holding the actor responsible for a particular decision or act performed 
earlier.
If culpable negligence always requires both synchronic and diachronic MWS, 
then a very intoxicated driver would not be culpable for negligence in hitting a 
child while drunk, provided (as seems probable) that he was temporarily without an 
MWS. This would seem to be an unacceptable result. Central to our theory—and to 
Hart’s notion of capacity responsibility, and any capacitarian theory of legal respon-
sibility, really—is that one is worthy of legal sanction only if the law can serve as a 
reason for action; or, only if one can understand legal and moral rules and conform 
one’s behavior to those rules. In such cases we bite the bullet and opt to ground 
responsibility in negligence cases in a diachronic assessment of MWS, looking to 
see if one had an MWS over a period of time sufficient to review or otherwise affect 
one’s decisions or acts with regard to the risk ultimately taken.
As already discussed, this emphasis on diachronic possession of an MWS 
acknowledges the ways in which identity and agency are built and maintained over 
time. The law does not provide reasons for or against acting only at the synchronic 
moment of decision or action; it is part of the normative milieu our reasons-respon-
siveness is scaffolded upon (McGeer and Pettit 2013; McGeer 2015), shaping our 
legal agency and motivating us to cultivate law-abiding dispositions.
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Of course, responsibility for a negligent act cannot rest solely on diachronic 
possession of an MWS. If this were the case, then persons would be responsible 
for harm caused when they were involuntarily intoxicated. What makes a person 
responsible in a drunk driving case is that the person knew drinking and driving 
was a risky behavior that could cause harm; and because they possessed an MWS 
they had the ability to shape their mental states/dispositions/environment so as to 
avoid the risk of causing harm when intoxicated. We might be tempted to try to 
trace back to a particular moment when a person engaged their MWS with regard 
to those risks of drunk driving; but we believe (1) there are likely to be many 
such moments, and they are difficult to parse; and (2) it is equally important to 
responsibility that the person did not use their diachronic capacity for guidance 
control to avoid drunk driving. In other words, tracing would not provide us with 
a full explanation as to why a drunk driver is responsible.
c. Agule on RB on Negligence
In his intelligent and probing comments, Craig Agule (this volume) provides another 
example of negligence to test our theory: Jeri Dawn Montgomery was chatting on 
her cell phone when she realized that she was about to miss her entrance to the high-
way. She swerved to make the entrance, causing an accident that resulted in a death, 
and was convicted of criminally negligent homicide. Agule stipulates that Mont-
gomery was unaware of the risk she was causing to others at the time she acted. 
Contra Moore (see below), Agule indicates that negligence cases like Montgomery’s 
can be handled by theories like ours without looking to counterfactual conditions to 
ground responsibility, albeit with a few friendly amendments.
As Agule notes, the Montgomery case makes the difficulties with tracing back 
to a decision or action for which a person can be held responsible in cases of neg-
ligence clear. There does not seem to be an earlier moment at which Montgomery 
had knowledge regarding the risks involved in the behavior that caused the acci-
dent. There is “no particular point at which the agent was aware of the possibility 
of acting to avoid the later risk” (Agule, this volume). That is, there seems to be 
no moment where there is a culpable mental state (in terms of awareness of a risk 
of harm) to trace back to.
Like us, Agule is sympathetic to Hart’s capacitarian strategy for handling neg-
ligence. That is, if one has the right sort of capacities necessary to legal agency 
at the time of a voluntary action, and they had a “fair opportunity to exercise 
those capacities,” one has the “guidance control” necessary for legal responsibil-
ity. Much of intentional action flows from knowledge and desires that are in some 
sense unconscious, but this does not mean that these beliefs and desires are “not 
ours” or that we are not in control of behavior that issues from them; if that were 
true, no one would be responsible for anything. On our theory, a person has the 
right sort of control when their action is produced by a reasons-responsive mech-
anism, which underpins both the capacity to understand legal and moral rules and 
the ability to conform one’s behavior to these rules.
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Agule worries, however, that our theory is too permissive in classifying persons 
as responsible in cases of negligence because we hold persons responsible when a 
person’s executive functions should have played a role in preventing an agent’s act 
or omission (that is, the person possessed an MWS but it didn’t engage with regard 
to the risk). Agule claims that one benefit of a capacitarian account of responsibil-
ity is that one is not forced to adopt a counterfactual approach to handle negligence 
cases. Contra Moore, Agule claims our approach rests responsibility on a counter-
factual understanding of something that should have happened, instead of finding a 
state of affairs within the agent that actually did happen to justify responsibility. In 
such cases it would seem guidance control is lacking, at least with regard to the pos-
sible risk of harm; and yet we want to hold someone responsible anyway.
As our discussion of Moore above may suggest, we think Agule’s worries about 
counterfactual language are overblown. We do not see counterfactual language as 
incompatible with, or even deeply different from, a sensible understanding of mech-
anisms and what they can do, and hence feel no need to purify our reasons-respon-
sive account of any and all counterfactual language. Even so, Agule offers us a way 
to strengthen our theory’s handling of negligence cases by specifying what it means 
to possess a synchronic MWS at the time negligent harm is caused. He indicates we 
ought to hold a person responsible if (1) they have an MWS, (2) they act or omit to 
act, and (3) their MWS plays a role in their action or omission (Agule forthcom-
ing, 9). Agule notes that this means the sort of awareness necessary to purposely 
or knowingly commit crime seems to have to do with the allocation of attentional 
resources (Agule citing Murray, 10). In negligence cases these resources are not 
illuminating information about the risk, but this does not mean executive functions 
are “offline” with regard to an act. If a person is not paying attention to such risks, 
synchronic inhibition based upon assessment of that risk is impossible, even though 
the person is, in an important sense, in control of the action that caused legal harm. 
Obviously, it is possible to perform risky behaviors without being consciously aware 
of the risk at the time the act is committed.
Agule says that on our executive theory, agents in cases like Montgomery’s may 
be understood as responsible for their negligent wrongdoing where their executive 
functions are “engaged with” the risk in some—possibly unconscious—sense, but 
attentional focus is not on the risk (Agule, 11). We might see Montgomery’s MWS 
“engaged with” the risk by noting the quick task-switching from her conversation to 
her driving and back again, indicating that her cognitive system recognizes the risk 
of becoming completely absorbed by her conversation. Agule notes we ought not to 
privilege attention as a part of an MWS necessary to responsibility, and we agree, 
to an extent. Attention to certain reasons or facts, again, is important to synchronic 
inhibition based upon those reasons or facts. And this is important to the highest 
levels of responsibility. But we still do have guidance control in cases of negligence, 
and importantly, a functioning MWS gives us diachronic control over what we pay 
attention to and how many and what types of risks we are likely to take. The claim 
that “the more executive functioning there is, the more agential engagement there 
is, and thus the more culpable wrongdoing” seems right (Agule forthcoming, 12). 
Lesser levels of responsibility seem appropriate with lesser levels of engagement 
between MWS and beliefs relevant to the assessment of risk.
1 3
Criminal Law and Philosophy 
In some cases, however, it seems that “the agent never realizes their behavior 
is risky” (13). Even so, if the agent possesses a sufficient minimal set of executive 
functions, “the agent’s executive functioning takes up the relevant evidence, and the 
agent’s executive system guides the agent’s behavior” (13). To handle these cases, 
Agule further amends our theory further to require: (1) an MWS, (2) an action or 
omission, and (3) that the MWS played a role in the action or omission by being 
engaged with background beliefs relevant to the risk, and perceptions of the fea-
tures of the situation relevant to the risk. This requires no actual engagement with a 
perception of risk, unconscious—as exhibited by Montgomery’s quick task-switch-
ing—or not. Instead, Montgomery need only have background beliefs such as “It is 
dangerous to quickly cross two lanes of traffic without looking,” and “I am crossing 
two lanes of traffic quickly without looking now,” that could have given rise to a per-
ception of risk. This move seems to take us full circle back to a Stark-like position: 
We can hold someone responsible for negligence when they have background beliefs 
that could have led to an understanding of the risk, even where the belief regard-
ing the risk is not actually formed, and so long as they have the requisite level of 
doxastic self-control (Stark 2016, pp. 247–249). In this way Agule helpfully spells 
out in clear terms what it means for an agent to possess an MWS at the time of a 
negligent act, and why it matters to responsibility. However, on Agule’s analysis, 
persons without synchronic possession of an MWS—but only diachronic—would 
not be responsible. Again, we certainly agree that these are the “easier” cases of 
negligence, although we argue that in some rare cases, diachronic possession of an 
MWS may be enough to ground responsibility, because one’s MWS had engaged 
with the risk and diachronic possession of an MWS means one could have exercised 
self-control over time to avoid the risk.
2  Does Our Theory Have Novelty/Normative Import?
Our commenters, especially Morse and Patterson, rightly want more than just a good 
fit between our theory of MWS and legal categories of responsibility. They want 
our theory to do explanatory work and offer the possibility of a normative effect. 
Instead, they claim, our theory is interesting but inert. Patterson notes that, at its 
core, negligence law is about holding persons responsible for violating a standard 
of care where that violation results in legal harm. We are responsible for such viola-
tions even where they involve a failure to pay attention or take note of a risk. Why 
appeal to an MWS at all, says Patterson? Why not just allude to diachronic posses-
sion of capacity responsibility in Hart’s sense? Similarly, Morse is extremely skepti-
cal that facts about executive functions and the brain processes that realize them can 
offer anything “new” in the way of normative implications beyond what behavioral 
analysis can provide.
We think our discussion of negligence revealed some interesting things, espe-
cially that the justification for holding persons responsible for lapses or inatten-
tion may be somewhat different than for voluntary intoxication; we note that Hart’s 
analysis does not shed light on these differences. But we think our best chance of 
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showing the potential normative impact of our theory is to focus on our views of 
juvenile culpability, and we will focus on that topic in this part of our response.
Morse finds little that is novel or valuable in our discussion of juveniles. The 
immaturity excuse and juvenile courts are longstanding features of the criminal law, 
and in any case neuroscience is not the place to look, he argues—we already know 
from the way young people behave that they are immature agents sometimes entitled 
to leniency, so what does a more granular knowledge of the maturing brain add to 
that picture?
We think Morse may be missing the primary thrust of our discussion of juvenile 
justice in RB. The main point of applying our theory of responsibility to juvenile 
agents is not to make a bold new set of claims that need supporting evidence, but for 
emerging facts about juvenile cognition to serve as supporting evidence for our core 
theory. Morse is quite right that excuses based on immaturity are a long-established 
fixture of the criminal law, and that developmental psychologists, legal scholars, and 
philosophers have already staked out the territory of why juveniles often receive 
(and deserve) a break. What we hope to achieve, however, is to get beyond gen-
eralities about how juvenile agency compares to its adult counterpart, and even to 
push against the juvenile–adult binary that may obscure more than it reveals. This is 
where we think neuroscientific findings can have important normative implications 
about the responsibility of young people.
RB’s discussion of juvenile justice aims to make finer-grained distinctions among 
agents and classes of agents through the identification of the specific brain mecha-
nisms that enable responsible agency. Understanding the complexities of how these 
mechanisms develop and mature, and how they manifest in behavior, is not some-
thing that we would expect to completely revolutionize the juvenile justice system. 
A better understanding of brain maturation does not “change everything,” and we 
would certainly want to resist the “lobbyist neuroscience” that Francis Shen warns 
about (2013, 999). But the choice is not between “changing everything” and chang-
ing nothing. Our relatively modest hope is simply that our theory enables a more 
fine-grained and accurate assessment of culpability among juvenile offenders; and 
our contention is that this understanding calls for them to be treated, in general, with 
greater leniency.
In RB we call for some specific changes to the current way in which juvenile 
offenders are handled. Currently, persons who commit a crime under the age of 18 
are handled by the juvenile court system unless they get transferred to adult court. 
Jurisdictions differ, but in the US cases most likely to get transferred are the most 
serious ones—that is, a murder or armed robbery is much more likely to transfer 
to adult court than theft. We disagree with transfer based on category of crime—
as many do—but also recommend a scalar approach to responsibility and a graded 
structure of legal categories to give a finer-grained and more accurate assessment of 
how juvenile offenders develop toward full, adult-level responsibility. We do so on 
the basis of emerging science indicating the rate at which different executive func-
tions become fully developed.
On our view, offenders under the age of 12 would be under an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of incapacity on grounds of immaturity; those from 13 to 17, under an 
irrebuttable presumption of diminished capacity on grounds of immaturity; and 
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those from ages 18 to 21, under a rebuttable presumption of diminished capacity on 
grounds of immaturity. From the age of 22 onward offenders would be under a pre-
sumption of adult-level capacity that cannot be rebutted on grounds of immaturity, 
though not one that is irrebuttable simpliciter. To complement this reform of the 
guilt phase, we should also rethink the dominant approaches to punishing juveniles 
at the sentencing phase—when interventions are appropriate, they ought to reflect 
the reduced culpability of juvenile offenders and promote rather than (further) arrest 
the development of executive capacities. Enacting these proposals would, obviously, 
entail a comprehensive revolution of the juvenile justice system—not changing eve-
rything, again, but far from changing nothing.
Morse (this volume) disagrees with our proposal, but his main complaint has less 
to do with its substance or justification and more to do with the fact that our pro-
posal is, in his telling, “effectively based entirely on behavioral analysis despite the 
apparently obligatory invocations of brain maturation”. His question of what all this 
“brain talk” comes to is well taken—it calls to mind a past remark of Morse’s on the 
same topic of juvenile justice: “If the behavioral differences between adolescents 
and adults were slight, it would not matter if their brains were quite different. Simi-
larly, if the behavioral differences were sufficient for moral and constitutional differ-
ential treatment, then it would not matter if the brains were essentially indistinguish-
able” (Morse and Roskies 2013, xxii).
We grant that our understanding of executive function in juveniles is informed 
by behavioral analysis. Because the criminal law speaks in the language of folk psy-
chology, neuroscientific results must be linked to behaviors and behavioral capaci-
ties if they are to illuminate aspects of responsible agency in juveniles. Surely, the 
mere inclusion of behavioral analysis with neuroscience in an approach to juvenile 
responsibility—along with attention to the broadening life experiences of adoles-
cents, the increasing range of reasons to which maturing juveniles can become sen-
sitive, and more—does not render the neuroscientific findings empty or otiose.
Morse’s worries are legitimate, and we appreciate being pressed from his direc-
tion on the novelty and normative import of our theory. But we find this line of 
critique to be hampered by persistent false dichotomies, including the suggestion 
that an approach using both neuroscientific and behavioral data is simply “behavio-
ral analysis,” as if one could either have a neuroscientifically informed approach to 
juvenile justice or a behaviorally informed one, but not one that was both.
This last point raises the question that is at the heart of Morse’s and Patterson’s 
comments: If something like our tiered structure of juvenile responsibility is a good 
idea, isn’t that already sufficiently established by the psychological and behavioral 
evidence on offer? What exactly does the neuroscience add? Without overstating 
the case or engaging in “neurohype,” let us sketch five or six possible, provisional 
answers.
First, neuroscience complicates and enriches the emerging view of when, on 
average, young people reach adult-level normative competence. If our moral and 
legal practices deem it important to discount culpability in light of immaturity, then 
the details of how maturation occurs can matter a great deal, and neuroscience fur-
nishes a key source (though not the only source) of data on that score. Attending 
to the neuroscientific details can help cure legal scholars and practitioners of the 
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simplistic, potentially misleading idea of a unified, progressive trajectory of “brain 
development,” because, as Somerville (2016) argues, maturation occurs at several 
levels simultaneously. One can speak of maturity with respect to structure in isola-
tion from maturity with respect to, for instance, function or intrinsic connectivity. 
The “maturational asymptotes” for some of these levels appear to converge; others 
appear to diverge; furthermore, each of these levels itself comprises multiple indices 
of maturation. Even focusing on functional maturity alone, “there is no single pro-
gression” to be found. Rather, “neural activity intensifies and reduces, varies quan-
titatively and qualitatively, in linear and nonlinear ways that are both linked to—and 
independent of—behavioral differences across development” (Somerville 2016, p. 
1166).
Having a better sense of these complexities would mean a better sense of what 
certain neuroimaging evidence might—or might not—suggest about a given juve-
nile’s psychological and behavioral capacities. Evidence of a functional or struc-
tural abnormality in a juvenile offender’s brain might be highly relevant to assessing 
his normative competence relative to his chronological age; it seems equally likely, 
however, that a single index of neurobiological maturity would be (reasonably!) 
judged insufficient, if not irrelevant, to questions of normative competence. If one is 
worried that neuroscientific results will be applied in reckless or overzealous ways 
to matters of law and policy, then more engagement with these results in all their 
complexity is the best way forward. The cure for “brain overclaim syndrome,” in 
Morse’s (2006) memorable turn of phrase, is not less neuroscience but more of it.
A more accurate, nuanced, and complete picture of the “multiple maturities” 
(Somerville 2016) that underwrite normative competence should also help push 
back against the strict binary between juveniles and adults that continues to hold 
sway in legal and scientific contexts. This binary has some obvious usefulness, but 
it also has a circular, self-justifying logic: Scientific studies often use 18 as the “cut-
off” age between adolescence and adulthood, partly because that age is so frequently 
the relevant legal division between juveniles and adults; the findings from such 
studies, even if they have novel implications in some respects, implicitly reinforce 
the legitimacy of that legal cutoff, which in turn justifies the cutoff being used in 
further scientific studies, and so on. Breaking this unhelpful cycle will take efforts 
within the legal world and the scientific one, as well as thoughtful communication 
between the two. The age-of-18 cutoff does not necessarily have to be thrown out as 
a useless and arbitrary boundary in either field, but both would be better served by 
moving toward a model comprising several “cutoffs” between phases of adolescence 
and young adulthood, allowing both courts and scientists to make finer distinctions 
among a population that is undergoing a dynamic and complex process of neural and 
psychological development that tends not to “level off” until well into the twenties.
Along these lines, another promising contribution from neuroscience comes from 
several ongoing large, multimodal brain imaging projects, which hold the promise of 
establishing standards, backed by huge datasets, for normative brain development. 
These projects, such as the Lifespan Human Connectome Project in Development 
(Harms et  al. 2018, enrolling over 1,300 subjects aged 5–21) and the Adolescent 
Brain Cognitive Development study (Casey et al. 2018, including over 10,000 ado-
lescents in a longitudinal study), are still in early stages, and their leaders are careful 
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to note the limits of their findings. Still, the prospect of establishing multimodal 
neurocognitive “growth curves”—not unlike the familiar ones used by pediatricians 
to put your child’s height and weight in context—has obvious relevance for juve-
nile justice. As neuroimaging evidence increasingly finds its way into courtrooms in 
ways that may either illuminate or mislead (Farahany 2015; Kuersten 2016), advo-
cates, judges, and juries may be prompted to consider what healthy brain develop-
ment looks like in a typical 9-year-old, 15-year-old, or 20-year-old. Only high-pow-
ered studies like the ones above offer the hope of an answer.
Another application of neuroscience in this context would be determining rela-
tive similarities between age-range groups. Offenders in their late teens and early 
twenties are a group of particular focus in juvenile justice, in part because they clus-
ter around the traditional cutoff age of adult criminal responsibility. Even if we are 
speaking quite generally or in terms of “average” members of these groups, it would 
be worth knowing whether, with regard to the structures and processes that subserve 
executive function, the average 20-year-old’s brain is more similar to that of an aver-
age 15-year-old or an average 25-year-old, despite being chronologically equidistant 
from both.
Establishing a general picture of what “average” or “typical” brains look like at 
various stages of development is, as the foregoing examples indicate, highly relevant 
to questions of juvenile justice. But generalizations only go so far; each young per-
son’s brain follows a unique “journey” of development in a unique social and expe-
riential context. This is all the more reason, however, to sweat the neuroscientific 
details. In this spirit, another of our commenters, Federica Coppola (2018), articu-
lates some of the ways that neuroscience could inform practices of sentencing and 
treatment, by using “neuroprediction” to model and assess young offenders’ risk of 
future criminal behavior and tailor interventions to fit a particular young person’s 
situation. Naturally this proposal comes with a host of legal and moral concerns, 
yet Coppola offers a compelling account of how those concerns can be addressed 
in the pursuit of an approach to sentencing that is both less retributive and more 
finely tuned to the needs and developmental trajectories of individual offenders. 
When used carefully—and always, of course, in conjunction with psychological and 
behavioral data—developmental neuroscience can help us discern, for each individ-
ual juvenile offender, what sorts of interventions are developmentally appropriate 
and well-timed to foster rehabilitation and social reintegration (Coppola 2018).
Some of these possibilities may be a long way off yet—some require a more 
mature neuroscience, and a far more robust and well-settled body of findings. But 
these are chiefly practical problems to be settled in the lab and the scanner; they are 
not reflective of in-principle limits on what neuroscience might reveal, suggest, or 
imply regarding juvenile responsibility. The theory of juvenile culpability promoted 
in RB provides a framework that we think reflects the current state of things regard-
ing developmental neuroscience. However, our theory is well-situated to accommo-
date emerging neuroscience, to the point where our presumptions of incapacity and 
capacity may shift in light of new evidence.
Although we have primarily drawn on Morse’s remarks in this section, we would 
argue that many of these points apply to Patterson’s (2021) criticisms of inertness as 
well. Patterson alleges that our account offers, at best, only “an elaborate explication 
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of what we already know” (9). This remark echoes Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
Roper, wherein he noted that juveniles’ reduced culpability is part of the common 
wisdom that “any parent knows.” But when it comes to something like the delicate 
and complex process by which a non-responsible child develops into a fully-respon-
sible adult—and the way a massive system of laws and punishments handles that 
process—the details of “what we already know” matter a great deal and explicat-
ing them can have significant normative impact on judgments of culpability and 
practices of punishment. Understanding how the distinct-but-never-entirely-separate 
executive functions come online, develop, and gradually expand the reasons-respon-
siveness of juveniles led us to recommend important revisions to the way juvenile 
offenders are handled, so we do not think our theory is simply a matter of filling 
in the specifics of a general theory already set down by Hart and others. But even 
if this were the case, it would hardly make those specifics inert: for example, new 
specifics may mean new measures of neurological and psychological maturity are 
taken as evidence of responsible agency. This point generalizes to cover not only 
our discussion of juvenile justice, but cases involving legal insanity, psychopathy, 
negligence, and more. The value of our project lies in connecting, e.g., Hart’s broad 
(and broadly correct!) views about capacity and responsibility to a detailed neurosci-
entific account of how executive functions work in different kinds of brains; the nor-
mative implications of that connection, if not of the neuroscientific facts themselves, 
are potentially profound.
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